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This  study  examines  how  inventors’  breadth  and  depth  of  expertise  inﬂuence  innovation  in 3M,  a com-
pany  renowned  for sustained  innovation  for  over a century.  While  prior  research  tends  to examine  a
single  indicator  – the  technical  success  achieved  by the  inventor  –  our study  differentiates  between  three
indicators  of a successful  inventor:  (1)  the number  of  inventions  generated;  (2)  the  extent  to  which
the  inventor  has  a signiﬁcant  impact  in  his  or her technical  domain;  and  (3)  the  inventor’s  career  suc-
cess,  in  terms  of  the  commercial  value  they  have brought  by converting  their  inventions  into  products
that  generate  sales  for commercial  organizations.  We  found  that  breadth  of  inventor  expertise  relates
to  the  generation  of  many  inventions,  but  not  necessarily  to those  that  are  technically  inﬂuential.  Depthxpertise and knowledge
esearch  and development
of  inventor  expertise  enables  individuals  to generate  technically  inﬂuential  inventions,  as  measured  by
patents  granted.  However,  both  breadth  and  depth  of expertise  are  required  for innovators  to  be deemed
highly  valuable,  based  on  their  records  of effectively  converting  inventions  into  commercially  successful
products.  Our  study  extends  prior research  on  innovation  in  two  ways.  We  provide  a  comprehensive  view
of  how  inventors’  expertise  inﬂuences  innovation  and  also  show  how  inventors  with  different  expertise
proﬁles  can  contribute  in  unique  ways  to their  organization.
.. Introduction
Management scholars have extensively examined what affects
nnovation in organizations, especially in research and devel-
pment (R&D) departments, whom companies depend on for
nventions that can be translated into new products for the ﬁrm
e.g., Collinson and Wang, 2012; den Hond, 1998; Schmickl and
ieser, 2008). There are, however, still many fundamental ques-
ions for which we do not have answers. Our study focuses on two of
hese questions: (1) How does the breadth and depth of expertise of
ndividual inventors inﬂuence their approach toward innovation;
nd (2) How does that, in turn, affect the value and contribution
hat inventors with different expertise proﬁles bring to the ﬁrm.
Innovation has been deﬁned in many ways, with a com-
on theme of building on existing knowledge and recombining
ast ideas and artifacts (Hargadon, 2002). Schumpeter (1934)
eﬁnes innovation as the process of generating novel combina-
ions from existing resources and ideas. This Schumpeterian view of
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innovation emphasizes how new ideas are built from existing ones.
An individual’s expertise is thus critical in helping individuals to
generate new knowledge and to create recombinations based on
existing information, as existing ideas are changed and recombined
to create innovative applications (Glynn, 1996; Mumford, 2000).
Even  though many inventions are created when individuals
work in teams (Jones et al., 2008), studies allude to the observa-
tion that individuals are effective in combining existing knowledge
to generate new knowledge and innovations (Gupta et al., 2006;
Taylor and Greve, 2006). As highlighted by Crossan et al. (1999),
innovative ideas and insights ﬁrst occur to individuals, before such
ideas are subsequently shared at the group levels and institution-
alized at the organizational level. Fundamentally, this highlights
that individuals are the basic unit in which knowledge integration
and knowledge creation takes place, regardless of whether individ-
uals work alone or in teams. Hargadon and Sutton (1997) further
make the point that individuals are able to generate innovative cre-
ations when they effectively transform and recombine knowledge
and information that they obtain from different domains. In their
study of teams involved in the creation and publishing of comic
books, Taylor and Greve (2006) also found that individuals were
able to combine knowledge more effectively than teams.
Open access under CC BY licenseThe  notebooks of Thomas Edison, one of the world’s greatest
inventors, show that he often recombined existing ideas in novel
ways (Budline et al., 1995). For example, Edison recombined ideas
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 new idea that led to the invention of the phonograph. He realized
hat a vibrating needle point would leave indentations on a piece
f paper (features of a telegraph) – the indentations could then be
layed back (features of a telephone transmitter) (Woodside, 2007).
y changing paper to tin foil, he generated an invention where
uman voice would vibrate a diaphragm, moving a stylus which
eaves grooves on the tin foil. When the machine is returned to the
tarting point, the grooves cause the diaphragm to vibrate again,
eproducing the original sound. As this example shows, transforma-
ion and combination of ideas often occur within individual actors,
emonstrating that individuals, on their own, transform and add
alue to ideas.
Despite the important role that individuals play in recombi-
ing existing knowledge to generate new ideas and inventions
Glynn, 1996), little research has directly explored how the exper-
ise proﬁles of inventors inﬂuence the way that they approached
he innovation process and how that affects the value that inven-
ors bring to the ﬁrm (Gruber et al., 2012). Prior research has
xamined and found that ﬁrms and teams that are effective in
ntegrating diverse expertise possessed by individual specialists
end to perform better (Rulke and Galaskiewicz, 2000; Tiwana
nd McLean, 2005; Wu and Shanley, 2009). There has, however,
een limited number of studies directly examining the impact of
readth and depth of inventor expertise at the individual level,
n innovation outcomes. Part of the reason for this lack of atten-
ion may  be an implicit assumption that there is no question to be
esolved.
One often assumes that specialization is a requirement for
nventions to happen. For example, studies have regarded inven-
ors to be knowledgeable in a domain area as long as inventors have
led at least one patent in the area (Melero and Palomeras, 2013).
his implies that a certain depth of knowledge is required before
omeone can generate an invention. On the other hand, studies
ave also highlighted that breadth of expertise is useful in provid-
ng the ability to integrate diverse ideas to generate new ones. The
iterature on network analysis, for example, has studied how indi-
iduals’ position in the social and/or knowledge structure inﬂuence
heir access to diverse information and thus their ability to gener-
te new ideas (Burt, 2004; Fleming et al., 2007; Obstfeld, 2005).
his literature suggests that individuals who have access to diverse
nformation are able to generate more good ideas by combining
iverse information.
Hence,  one can conclude from prior research that depth and
readth of expertise are important in different ways. Yet past
esearch has only examined breadth and depth of expertise as a sin-
le dimension at the individual level, when examining its impact.
or example, Leahey and Hunter (2012) examined the impact of
pecialization on lawyers’ earnings, and found that lawyers who
pecialized earned more. Leahey et al. (2010) found that specializa-
ion increased the propensity of academics in the sociology domain
o obtain tenure, due to the improved productivity and visibility.
ecent research appears to recognize that breadth and depth of
xpertise can have different impact, but has chosen to examine how
he diversity and depth of knowledge drawn upon at the patent
evel inﬂuenced the impact of the patent (measured in terms of the
umber of forward citations) (Lettl et al., 2009).
In this study, we explicitly examine how the breadth and depth
f inventor expertise inﬂuence their approach toward the inno-
ation process, and how that inﬂuences different outcomes. We
ocus on the examination of the breadth and depth of R&D inven-
or’s technical expertise. Depth of expertise refers to the level of
nowledge and skills (e.g. novice or expert) that an individual
olds in a technical domain area. Specialization cultivates profound
nowledge of an area, creating efﬁciency in generating repeated
ombinations of a narrow range of knowledge elements and deep
nderstanding of the interconnections between them (Katila andcy 43 (2014) 349– 366
Ahuja, 2002; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Breadth of expertise
refers to the diversity in knowledge, know-how and experiences
that an individual has accumulated (Fleming et al., 2007). Diver-
sity of knowledge often generates exposure to new ideas, creating
opportunities to experiment with new forms of knowledge (Katila
and Ahuja, 2002; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). We explicitly exam-
ine how inventors with different expertise proﬁles – generalists
with broad expertise, specialists with deep expertise and poly-
maths with broad and deep expertise, if they exist – tend to be
associated with different innovation outcomes, and how they con-
tribute to a ﬁrm in different ways.
Examining how the breadth and depth of inventor expertise
inﬂuence the value that they bring to the ﬁrm require researchers
to consider the role of the organization. The organizational context
– the practices of the ﬁrm, and the ways that an organization sup-
port inventors with different expertise proﬁle – would inﬂuence
the ﬁrm’s ability to leverage inventors with different expertise pro-
ﬁles. Lettl et al. (2009, p. 244), for example, found that independent
and corporate inventors beneﬁt from their expertise differently.
They argued that independent inventors are less likely than cor-
porate inventors to be able to bridge diverse technological ﬁelds
because “they lack the corporate intelligence systems and orga-
nizational resources to cope with the corresponding information
overload and complexity”. They highlight that an organizational
setting provides complementary resources that would help the cor-
porate inventors to deal with the negative aspects of and reap the
beneﬁts of diverse knowledge. We  thus conduct our study of indi-
vidual inventors within a single company, as a case study of an
organization with signiﬁcant emphasis and investment in R&D, to
examine how inventors with different expertise proﬁles bring value
to the organization.
By  focusing on inventors within a single ﬁrm, we are also able to
expand the deﬁnition and conceptualization of “value” that inven-
tors bring to ﬁrm, by considering not only outcomes that can be
determined by publicly available patent data, but also outcomes
that are more reﬂective of the commercial value that inventors
actually bring to the ﬁrm with their inventions. Prior research used
patent data to examine the impact of inventions, usually using for-
ward citations to provide an indication of the value and usefulness
of an invention (e.g., Fleming et al., 2007; Nerkar and Paruchuri,
2005). However, other researchers have pointed out that patent
citations, while providing a proxy measure that has some correla-
tion with the value of patents (Trajtenberg, 1990), is a rather noisy
indicator for the economic value of a patent (Harhoff et al., 1999;
Sampat and Ziedonis, 2005). While forward citations provide a good
assessment of how the invention inﬂuences future research in a
domain (Carpenter et al., 1981), they do not capture the extent to
which the invention has had a practical impact, e.g., by changing
actual products. Little research, so far, has made an explicit link
between patent citations and the social and private value of patents
(Sampat and Ziedonis, 2005).
We thus argue that while a patent with higher forward cita-
tions shows a higher level of technical advancement and signiﬁes a
greater inﬂuence on a technical domain, it is indicative of the value
of the invention rather than its innovative value. The process of
innovation is deﬁned as the “development and implementation of
new ideas by people” (Van de Ven, 1986, p. 590). In other words,
there are two  parts to innovation: (1) generating an idea or inven-
tion, and (2) converting that invention into a useful application
that is implemented and used by others (Roberts, 2007). An inven-
tion is a new idea, which may  be a recombination of old ideas; it
may or may  not have economic value. Ideas and inventions have
to be moved into a usable form to qualify as an innovation (King
et al., 1994; Taylor and Greve, 2006), and this process involves
the conversion of an invention into a product, to bring about






























































research scientists and how the breadth and depth of their exper-
tise inﬂuenced their approach toward innovation and the ways
that they generated and commercialized inventions in 3M.  TheW.F. Boh et al. / Resear
rganization in the process. Both invention and innovation are crit-
cal for successful generation of ideas and commercialization of
hose ideas for development of new products and processes.
Hence,  while an inventor’s forward citations provide a good
ndication of the technical value of an inventor’s inventions, they
o not indicate the value that an inventor’s innovations bring to an
rganization. The latter is hard to gauge, as it requires the tracking
f sales that an inventor’s inventions bring for an organization. One
ay to derive the value that an inventor brings to an organization
s to examine the career success of inventors in commercial orga-
izations that have directly tied the career success of inventors to
he commercial value they bring to the ﬁrm. In our case study orga-
ization, R&D personnel are expected to generate inventions that
an be used in products that will bring about sales. Thus, the most
uccessful R&D personnel are those who bring the greatest value to
he corporation by generating inventions that impact sales and the
ottom line (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1984; Kim and Oh, 2002).
e deﬁne career success as the status of an inventor in the R&D
epartment of the case study organization, which is indicated by
hether the inventor has been promoted to the highest technical
rganizational rank, and whether the inventor has received orga-
izational recognition for the contributions that his/her inventions
as brought to the ﬁrm. Hence, another key contribution of our
esearch is the broadening of the innovation outcome indicators
onsidered, by examining whether and how individual inventors’
xpertise breadth and depth inﬂuence different innovation out-
ome indicators.
In  order for us to examine our research questions, we  adopt a
ixed-method approach to empirically develop and test hypothe-
es about how inventors with different expertise proﬁles based on
heir breadth and depth of expertise bring value to the organiza-
ion. This approach adopts a two-phased design, the ﬁrst of which
nvolves a qualitative (case study) approach (Eisenhardt, 1989).
n this ﬁrst study, we seek to understand what are the inventors’
xpertise proﬁles; how inventors with different expertise proﬁles
pproach the innovation process; and what are the environment
onditions supporting the development of these expertise proﬁles.
his will provide us with the fundamental understanding of inven-
ors’ depth and breadth of expertise and how that inﬂuences the
ay they work. While the prior literature has long established that
oncepts of breadth and depth are important ways to characterize
n individual’s expertise, there have been limited ﬁeld studies that
ave actually examined how inventors and scientists characterized
y deep or broad in their expertise approach the innovation pro-
ess. We  would thus like to ﬁrst use the qualitative interview study
o gain insights into how these different types of inventors may
everage their expertise in different ways and how the organiza-
ion inﬂuences their ability to do so. This understanding will then
e integrated with current theoretical concepts from the literature,
o generate a set of hypotheses about how inventors with different
xpertise proﬁles bring value in different ways to the case study
rganization. Using patent data, combined with organizational data
bout individual inventors, we then conduct an empirical test of
he hypotheses in a second quantitative study. After discussing
he results of the second study, we conclude with implications for
uture research.
.  Case study site
We  conducted a comprehensive study of research scientists in
M,  a diversiﬁed technology company known for more than a cen-
ury for its sustained innovation capabilities. Despite its size (more
han 75,000 employees and operations all over the world) and age
established since 1902), 3M has been the poster child of innova-
ion and breakthroughs in R&D and product development. In thecy 43 (2014) 349– 366 351
practitioner domain, many articles have been written on 3M and its
innovation capabilities (e.g., Von Hippel et al., 1999). In the research
domain, case studies have showcased best practices adopted by 3M
in the areas of IT management (Roepke et al., 2000), human resource
management (Angle et al., 1985), and R&D programs evaluation
(Krogh et al., 1988). No research to date, however, has system-
atically examined how individual research scientists work within
3M to generate the innovations and technologies leading to the
company’s wide range of products. As the R&D department is the
starting point for most products and the principal source of inno-
vation within the corporation, this study of research scientists in
3M provides important insights to help us understand how 3M has
built and sustained its innovation capabilities for over a century.
3M  began by specializing in industrial abrasives and adhesives.
Over its 110-year history, it has expanded into a large and diversi-
ﬁed organization with more than 60,000 products, with innovation
as its key driver for growth. Key 3M products and technologies
include adhesives (including cellophane tape and Post-It notes),
abrasives, laminates, passive ﬁre protection, dental products, elec-
trical materials, electronic circuits, and optical ﬁlms. As of 2009,
the company was  organized into six operating business segments:
Industrial and Transportation; Health Care; Safety, Security and
Protection Services; Consumer and Ofﬁce; Display and Graphics;
and Electro and Communications.
3M’s  R&D group includes more than 6500 scientists and engi-
neers. As of 2009, the R&D Group was organized into the corporate
research laboratory and the division product development labora-
tories. The corporate research laboratories focus on basic research
in technologies, while the division product development labora-
tories tend to focus on research more speciﬁc to each business
segment. While 3M’s laboratories are distributed globally, most of
the R&D personnel are based in St. Paul, Minnesota, at the heart of
the innovation community.
3.  Study 1: exploratory study with ﬁeld interviews
3.1. Method and participants
As we are interested in understanding the role that inventors
with different expertise proﬁles play in helping a company like
3M become and maintain its role as one of the most innovative
companies in the world, we  ﬁrst began by conducting one-on-one
interviews with 33 research scientists who  were sampled based
on their expertise proﬁle. To sample interviewees, we ﬁrst con-
ducted a cluster analysis on their breadth and depth of expertise,
based on patent data.1 Using the FASTCLUS procedure in SAS, we
derived a solution that differentiated research scientists into four
clusters: (1) high depth and high breadth; (2) high depth and low
breadth; (3) low depth and high breadth; and (4) low depth and
low breadth. We focused on the ﬁrst three clusters, as they rep-
resented research scientists that had some form of expertise, and
we were interested to learn about the approaches that inventors
with different expertise proﬁles adopted toward the invention and
innovation process. We  randomly sampled interviewees from each
cluster, and our interviewees in each cluster included inventors
across organizational ranks, and from both the corporate research
laboratory and the division product development laboratories.
Following Eisenhardt (1989), the purpose of this phase was
to obtain a rich description and understanding of the proﬁle of1 Details about the patent data as well as the breadth and depth measures are
provided  in Section 5 of this paper.









































Interview quotes illustrating the usefulness of deep versus broad expertise.
Key ﬁnding Quote
Usefulness of deep expertise
Provide  detailed and
accurate  analysis
“A  depth person [sic] usually would be able to
analyze a problem in much more detail and with
accuracy and quality that I probably couldn’t.”
Make discoveries in
areas  that experts
are  familiar with
“Those  people who  are let’s just say light on being
an  expert in any one single area are not likely to
make discoveries or fundamental understandings
in any one of those areas, any discipline.
But. . . since I work in microreplication for 26
years, I am likely to be able to generate some good
discoveries in the microrep domain, as I have an
understanding of what we can do, and what we
can’t  do.”
Make trade-offs “So you got the ability to understand how to make
some tradeoffs. For example, if 2 things might have
similar optical performance while one of them is
easier  to manufacture, you have the depth to
understand that.”
Usefulness of broad expertise
Suggest new ways of
looking  at things
I’ll  pose something to him [a person with broad
expertise], and he always surprises me by coming
up with some way  of looking at it that I never
would have thought of.
Able  to understand
how  technologies
can  relate to other
areas
If  you say to me “we need some discoveries in
resin chemistry to put this microreplication in a
UV  environment or a chemical environment or
whatever”, you need a person with broad expertise
to do that.
Not burdened by prior If  you know all the things that can possibly go52 W.F. Boh et al. / Resear
nterviews were semi-structured. A set of interview protocol
uided the ﬂow of the interviews, but questions were adapted
ased on interviewees’ responses. Each interview lasted for 1–1.5 h.
ith the permission of the interviewees, interviews were recorded
nd transcribed. Otherwise, detailed notes were taken and tran-
cribed within the next 24 h. In total, 493 pages of transcribed text
ith 321,275 words were captured and analyzed.
We began each interview by asking interviewees to describe
he domain areas that they have worked in. We  then asked them
o characterize their own  breadth and depth of expertise. We  also
sked for their views on the advantages and limitations of inven-
ors with breadth or depth of expertise in 3M,  and about their
xperiences of working with such individuals. Interviewees were
lso asked to describe some recent work projects. During these
iscussions, interviewees described their approaches toward and
iews about innovation processes. Finally, we asked for their per-
eptions about 3M’s innovation culture and practices, in order to
btain information about the company’s context, culture and orga-
izational practices for innovation. (See Appendix A online for the
nterview protocol.)
.2.  Data analysis
Our  analysis followed an iterative process of moving back and
orth between our qualitative data and the literature. We  conducted
he analysis in two stages.
Stage 1. As a ﬁrst step in understanding the role of breadth and
depth  of expertise in an inventor’s work, we read the interviews,
and  used QSR NVivo, a qualitative data analysis program, to code
for  the following categories: (1) Context and Organizational Cul-
ture;  (2) Depth and Breadth of Expertise; (3) Strategies adopted by
Inventors.  We  also used open NVivo coding to capture additional
themes  that surfaced in the data collected.
Stage 2. Based on the initial analysis, we focused on the discussions
relating  to inventors’ expertise. We  then classiﬁed each inventor
into  a different expertise proﬁle, and we used the data to answer
the  following questions: (1) what are the advantages and disad-
vantages  of breadth and depth of expertise for 3M inventors; (2)
what are the expertise proﬁles of inventors in 3M;  (3) how do the
inventors become who they are (in terms of their expertise pro-
ﬁle);  (4) how do inventors with different expertise proﬁles succeed
in  the organization; and (5) how does 3M provide the environment
conditions that are conducive to the development and success of
inventors with different expertise proﬁles? We  present the results
of  this analysis in the subsequent section.
.3.  Results
Breadth and depth of expertise. Interviewees identiﬁed the
trengths and weaknesses of having broad versus deep expertise
or R&D work in 3M (see Table 1, which includes supporting quotes
rom interviews). According to our interview ﬁndings, inventors
ho have deep expertise are useful for providing detailed and
ccurate analysis of a problem, and solutions to difﬁcult technical
roblems in a domain. Their knowledge also gives them the exper-
ise and knowledge to make difﬁcult trade-offs and the ability to
redict what will go wrong. These are qualities that put people
ith deep expertise in good positions to generate important dis-
overies in their domain of expertise. On the other hand, inventors
ith broad expertise are usually the ones who are able to relate
echnologies to new areas as they have the breadth of expertise to
now how the varied technical issues may  be solved. Inventors with
road expertise are also known to be good for suggesting new per-
pectives and new ways in looking at a problem. This may  be partly
ecause their lack of deep expertise may  sometimes be a blessing asknowledge wrong. . . that makes us a little scared to
experiment and try new things
they are not overly burdened by existing viewpoints or knowledge
of everything that may  go wrong. Overall, our interviewees recog-
nized that broad expertise as well as deep expertise are useful in
their own ways, and are both required for the innovation process.
One quote from our interviewee summed this up well:
“Let’s look at this glass as an example. As I reﬁne this invention,
do  I want depth or breath? I would argue I need both. I need
depth  to say, “what is it that this is capable of being?” You can see
some  issues here on this sample, it is kind of yellowish, maybe a
little hazy. The person with depth will recognize the problems
here,  and work out: what are the ways in which one could solve
these  problems. . . There’s another question, “what is this good
for?”  We  can really do this high index, really inexpensive glass,
what  markets would value it? Now this is not a depth question,
it’s  a breadth question.”
3.4. Expertise proﬁles of 3M inventors
Our interviews revealed that there are specialists, with deep
and narrow expertise, and generalists, with broad and shallow
expertise, amongst the 3M inventors that we interviewed, and they
approached the innovation process very differently. Interestingly,
we found a third group of inventors, who  exhibited an expertise
proﬁle that had both deep and broad expertise. We discuss each
of the three groups of inventors, how they developed their exper-
tise proﬁle, how they leveraged their expertise proﬁle to become
successful in 3M,  and what characteristics of the 3M environment
helped them.
3.5.  SpecialistsR&D personnel are typically recognized to be specialists, as
they spend many years working on a domain, and are highly
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nd inventors with such an expertise proﬁle in 3M.  Many of the
pecialists we spoke with explained that to become and stay as
pecialists, they required focus and perseverance. An eleven year
roject described below by an interviewee testiﬁed to the require-
ent of such focus and perseverance.
“D3 [pseudonym] technology was the most difﬁcult. . . For the
ﬁrst  7 years, it was sort of a 15% skunk work kind of thing done
in  a lab without a lot of business pull, which was probably. . .
sort  of a typical 3M story. It was a good thing it probably didn’t
have  more pull because we didn’t know how to do it. So we  knew
what  we wanted to make but we didn’t know how to make it. So
we kind of went through a number of iterations, learning each
step  of the way before we ﬁnally sorted out and about in 2001,
it  became apparent that this actually was possible. . . That was
really  a gruelling experience but also a fantastic one. . .”
The specialists we interviewed exhibited such determination to
ork persistently on a particular technology in order to achieve a
igniﬁcant breakthrough in the invention. As highlighted by one
nterviewee, a specialist is typically someone who is “willing to be
ashing up this technology again and again and again and really
hape it out in depth”.
.6.  Strategies adopted by specialists to become successful in 3M
a.  Fit niche requirements of ﬁrms. The interviews revealed that
ome areas of expertise were in greater demand in 3M given the
usinesses that the company was in. For example, many materi-
ls sold by 3M,  like diaper tapes and tape backings are non-woven
aterials, which are classiﬁed as polyoleﬁns. Hence, as noted by
ne interviewee: “Having expertise in [polyoleﬁn] is particularly
dvantageous here [in 3M]”. Not everyone’s training, however, was
n the speciﬁc niche areas that 3M dealt with. Hence, several inter-
iewees highlighted that individuals sometimes needed to actively
dentify the right niche areas of expertise required by the ﬁrm, and
ultivate their expertise in that area, early on in their careers and
ecome specialists in these new areas of expertise. As highlighted
y one interviewee:
“After joining 3M,  I realized that there were many people. . .too
many  people working in the ﬂuorochemicals. So you have to ﬁnd
your own niche, so I started working in ﬂuoropolymers instead
of  ﬂuorochemicals. So I guess I was a small molecular chemist,
understanding reaction mechanisms of small molecules. I never
deal  with polymers – that was a big change for me.  However I
feel  that that was the company’s need. You got to do something
that  is interesting in the company, provide some value to the
company.”
b. Avoid tunnel vision by stepping back to fundamental princi-
les. While the ability of specialists to focus is a key trait enabling
hem to work through problems for generating inventions, being
oo focused, however, may  not always be positive. It becomes criti-
al, therefore, for specialists to recognize their tendency to become
oo narrowly focused, and to consciously take a step back and ana-
yze the issue based on fundamental principles. By returning to the
undamentals, specialists maintain their focus while not falling into
he trap of becoming tunnel-visioned.
“You make invested advances by, in my  opinion, failing often
and  having to sit down and think about what is really controlling
this?.  . . It’s all categorization and you gotta put it in boxes so that
you  can ﬁgure out what the end relationships are and if you can
get  to that point then you can be successful in manipulating it.
And  if you’re not and you just sit there, you’ll never get out of
the  box. It’s like you’re down in a cave with no ladder, you can’t
climb  out. You just feel that you’re gonna get buried. But youcy 43 (2014) 349– 366 353
gotta get to know the physical property of this. What is the true
physics  or chemistry that’s controlling what you’re doing and
when  you start thinking about that, then it’s pretty easy to stay
focused  and make really big inventions.”
Environment conditions conducive to specialists. Our interview
results reveal several organizational practices that had been par-
ticularly useful for specialists to be able to contribute to the
organization. As specialists are characterized by their perseverance
and focus, they may  work on a technology for years before they may
be able to show progress, but their inventions have the potential to
create completely new technologies for the ﬁrm. This has several
implications for the organization. First, the specialists need to be
given the space to experiment and the ﬁrm needs to tolerate fail-
ures that will result from the experimentation. In 3M, the practice
of allowing inventors to work on side projects for 15% of their time
provides inventors with the freedom to experiment, and the inno-
vation grants provided by the ﬁrm also provides additional funds
for inventors to sustain the initial and most risky phase of their
exploratory R&D work. In general, slack and less pressure to show
results in the short term are all key environmental characteristics
that helped specialists to develop highly impactful technologies, as
highlighted by the following interviewee:
“We  made a ton of money during those years on some prod-
uct  protected by patents, made it a little easier for us to invent
basic  technology, might be tougher to do that now. On the other
hand,  the history of 3M shows that you will be able to try to ﬁnd
some  ways to keep things going at low levels before they get
successful.”
In addition, perseverance was required not only on the part of
the individual inventor, but also on the part of the management, in
order to continue to support investment into technologies that have
the potential, but may  have failed in the short term. As highlighted
by one interviewee:
“Our ﬁrst couple of projects were not successful, we were tech-
nically  successful but for various business reasons we could not
reach  the ﬁnish line, but management at 3M was kind enough
to  continue. They had the foresight to see the value of the tech-
nology  and signiﬁcant investment was  made at that time to
strategically  value the technology.”
3.7. Generalists
Generalists were inventors with expertise in a broad range of
domain areas, but without deep expertise in any one of them. Our
interviews show that the typical generalist inventor had broad
interests and can become easily bored if s/he stays for too long in
one domain area. The generalist is characterized as someone who
prefers to work in new areas constantly. One generalist interviewee
explained his preference for working in diverse areas:
“I would always have 4 or 5 projects I was working on and I
would  purposefully try to make them diverse across the entire
company.  . . I wouldn’t just focus in on our medical group or
our  Display and Graphics group or something. I would say: “I am
working on 2 things with them, let’s see if I can go talk with some
friends  that I know in a different complete group or division
just  to say: “Let’s have lunch and what are you working on?
What  kind of things might I be able to help with or what are you
looking  at for the future?””We found that generalists often broadened their expertise in
one of two  ways. First, they were willing to constantly learn
about completely new domain areas. One interviewee, for example,
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n his 10 years with 3M:  “ﬁlm manufacturing, coating processes,
nti-static materials, hardcoats, UV curable materials – Things that
 had very little to do with in my  previous life”. Another interviewee
ent to the extent of taking courses in a University to learn about
he medical domain in order to better understand the area:
“So when I came to medical [division], I obviously wasn’t trained
in  medical at all, I’m an engineer. The ﬁrst thing I found out, I
didn’t  know anything about medical, so I went back to Univer-
sity  and took nano-physiology and all these things to get up to
speed  on body parts and stuff. That’s the key. In this company,
you  can bounce. you may  bounce around to totally different
areas  that you’re not used to. You just fortify your base knowl-
edge  and learn more about that particular area that you’re in.”
Second, interviewees also leveraged their previous knowledge
y creatively generating new combinations that integrated com-
onents of their prior knowledge and new domain areas that they
ad to learn about. One interviewee explained:
“I  combine [the new domain area – a thermoplastic compound]
with  some of the knowledge that I had [a thermosetting com-
pound]  and I came up with something that is totally different,
which  is a combination of 2 polymers. . . So combining both,
people  used to say, “how can you mix  these 2 polymers that are
totally  incompatible, they don’t like each other?” My  answer
is  that, “why should you automatically limit yourself?” You
have  to do it and see what you get out of that. And actually,
the  incompatibility is an advantage, because when we mix  the
2  components together, one of the components, a thermoset,
which is in a minor face actually migrates towards the inter-
face,  when you are trying to bond this material. So you form a
structural  bond with very little thermoset, so the thermoplastic
face  is just carrying the thermoset. So the combination of those
2  things, turned out to generate a very useful invention.”
.8. Strategies adopted by generalists to become successful in 3M
Generalists  adopted a very different approach toward innova-
ion compared to specialists. We  discuss two key strategies adopted
y generalists, which reveal that while generalists may  work in
iverse domains, their approach toward innovation is similar across
omains:
a. Focus on application. In contrast to specialists who are focused
ore on the development of groundbreaking technologies, gen-
ralists appear to emphasize the application of technologies into
seful products, and the integration of multiple technologies into
 product. As highlighted by one interviewee,
“I  belong to the class of people who. . . apply utility to [the tech-
nology].  For example, tapes is nothing more than a sticky mess,
unless  you have a good way of dispensing it, unless this little
roll  that it is on freely rotates and you can access it, cut it and it
still  stays in part. We  are the system integrators.”
b.  Focus on fundamental skills. Our interviewees also highlighted
hat despite changing domains, and working in new domains, they
istil a set of fundamental skills that they take with them and
pply, regardless of the domain area. First and foremost, inter-
iewees highlighted the importance of problem solving skills,
hich they have cultivated and honed, as they worked across
omains:“I  think you learn at 3M,  it is not necessarily what you know, but
it  is your problem-solving skills that are most important. You’ll
see  people change ﬁelds fairly dramatically, but the problem-
solving  skills remain applicable no matter your domain.”cy 43 (2014) 349– 366
Other  skills that are portable across domains include the ability
to observe and understand customer needs, and to conduct com-
petitive analysis. As highlighted by one interviewee:
“No matter where I go, the key is to really understand the cus-
tomer  and to create, looking at the scene, how they’re doing this.
I  observe customers all the time and what I think they’re doing
wrong,  what I think they can do better. . . that’s how I create
ideas  off them.”
Environment conditions conducive to generalists. 3M has an envi-
ronment that makes it particularly conducive to generalists. 3M
has more than 60,000 products in six operating business segments.
The ﬁrm has a “periodic table of technologies”, which lists 45 dif-
ferent technologies that the company owns, ranging from abrasives
to biotechnology, highlighting the breadth of technologies that the
company deals with. Interviewees point out that one key attrac-
tion of working in 3M is that the company has many technologies
and talent knowledgeable about them under one roof. This, coupled
with having a very open and helping culture, helps individuals to
obtain access to signiﬁcant resources.
“We  have more technologies under one roof here at 3M than
almost  anybody else in the world and it is freely accessible. . .
I’ve  told people for a long time I’m a kid in a candy store here. I
still  feel like a kid you know, I enjoy going to the annual events
and  seeing the new technologies and ﬁguring out is there some-
thing  I can do to help them or is there some way they can help
me  in my  projects.”
The diversity of the ﬁrm, coupled with the 3M policy – a philoso-
phy widely-accepted by employees – that the technology is owned
by the company, prevents people from having “Not-Invented-Here”
syndromes, and encourages individuals to explore innovative asso-
ciations between different technologies.
“One  of the biggest advantages that we have is – we  believe
in  3M,  the product belongs to the different businesses but the
technology  belongs to the company. People – at least the tech-
nical  community really truly believe that and it is supported by
the  top most management. That’s what enables the barrierless
movement of technology. If you look at our “periodic table of
technologies”, we can pull from all these different areas to put
something  together. That’s what we just take for granted.”
Hence, the diversity of the ﬁrm and the opportunity to access
and combine many different technologies provides a conducive
environment for generalists to ﬂourish.
3.9. Polymaths
Prior research tends to classify individuals into specialists (indi-
viduals with high depth and low breadth of expertise) or generalists
(individuals with high breadth and low depth of expertise). Among
the 3M inventors, we found a group of people who  could be con-
sidered polymaths – individuals with both high depth and high
breadth of expertise. These polymath inventors are recognized
experts with deep expertise in one or more core domain areas,
but they have widened their knowledge and expertise to apply the
technologies that they have championed widely across the organi-
zation. The following quote appropriately characterizes a polymath
inventor:
“If  you wanna try to achieve, then you pretty much have to be
very  focused in one area. I think each one of those individuals
[corporate scientists] probably has one area that they proba-
bly  are considered one of the top people in the ﬁeld, but at the
same  time, they also recognize that if you really want to max-
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of learning in other areas, and it is hard, you can’t be the best at
everything,  I think a lot of us try to ﬁnd an area where we try
to  be one of the best and then maybe we can continue to learn
other  areas.”
This ﬁnding highlights that the polymath inventors were not
eep in all the areas that they were knowledgeable about; rather,
hey had deep expertise in their core domain area, and they learn
bout new technological domains as they apply and relate their core
xpertise to new areas, thus gaining some knowledge of a broad
ange of domain areas.
In  addition, rather than simply applying technologies broadly
o new domains, the deep knowledge that the polymath inventors
ave about their core domains of expertise allow them to effectively
ecombine and integrate technologies from their core domain areas
o new domain areas. This process of recombination and integration
oes not simply generate applications to existing technologies, but
ather, generates new inventions that can be applied to multiple
roducts. An interviewee provided a good example illustrating this
oint:
“My  core domain expertise is in ﬂuorochemicals. I’ve integrated
my  domain with the electrical domain to create the electrical
ﬂuorination process to make ﬂuorochemicals. . . and that elec-
trical  ﬂuorination process produces some reactive molecules
that  we’ve been able to take and convert to new materials that
3M  hadn’t had available before and those materials have unique
properties  that have uses in industry, so we’ve been able to
develop  products from them that didn’t exist previously.”
.10. Strategies adopted by polymaths to become successful in 3M
Polymaths adopt strategies that leverage both their breadth and
epth of expertise.
a.  Evaluation and identiﬁcation of ideas. Polymath inventors use
oth their breadth and depth to actively evaluate ideas and iden-
ify the ones worthwhile to pursue. One polymath inventor, for
xample, explains his thought process when evaluating ideas:
“One of the things I do a great deal is map  inventions. I look
at  the initial invention and distill it down to what’s different,
what  is it that this invention does that previous inventions or
technologies  could not? So, I look at this [picks up a piece of
glass],  number one by far, it is cheap and inexpensive to form and
has really high index. So these are the two differentiators, and
so  we start asking the question, what groups would care? What
industries  would care about this and value it? And we’ll come
up  with a list. . . could be biomedical, automotive, commercial
graphics, or lighting. And I always go through those and say, ok
then  which one of this would REALLY like this.”
The quote shows that his depth of expertise plays a key role in
dentifying the technical contributions of an idea, while he draws
pon his breadth of expertise to evaluate the potential ways the
nvention can impact different industries.
b. Championing technologies in core domain. Polymath inventors
dopt a strategy of actively championing one or more technologies
n their core domain, applying, integrating and recombining this
echnology with a broad spectrum of domains and technologies. As
ointed out by a polymath inventor, they would be “living, breath-
ng, eating and sleeping [the technology], with a singular focus on
etting this thing to be successful”. The polymath’s approach of
hampioning a technology typically involves developing the tech-
ology and obtaining broad usage for the technology. This was
o easy feat, as illustrated by the experiences of one polymath.
e described how his ﬁrst project failed due to a business deci-
ion not to continue investing in his technology, but instead ofcy 43 (2014) 349– 366 355
giving  up, he decided to pursue a broad strategy of championing
the technology.
“When that project was a failure and I came back to St Paul, at
that  time, I had the opportunity to think – what could I do at
that  time. So that’s when I started thinking that this technology
should be looked at more broadly than just diamond-like carbon
ﬁlms,  because the technology is broadly applicable. . . the focus
was  not a good thing. When I branched out into all the other
areas  that the technology could be applied to, that was when I
found  several new products.”
This polymath inventor, however, faced multiple hurdles in try-
ing to apply his technology broadly to new areas; it was his breadth
and depth of expertise that enabled him to work through the prob-
lems. As the technology he championed was  new, it made the
manufacturing division skeptical about the feasibility of the tech-
nology in scaling up for production. In order to “sell” the technology
to the division, he engineered the machines to create prototypes
showing the ability to scale and provided cost estimates about
how he could help the business unit to save money. It was not
typical of scientists to have to build the actual machines to manu-
facture using their technology, but his depth of expertise enabled
him to do so. His breadth of expertise enabled him to understand
the manufacturing requirements and costs of different business
units, thus enabling him to gain wide acceptance for the new
technology.
While polymath and generalist inventors both focus on applica-
tions and recombinations of technologies, the difference between
them is that the polymath inventors anchor themselves in their
core domain technologies, and they consistently try to apply and
integrate these technologies to new areas. Generalist inventors, on
the other hand, focus on applications and recombinations of dif-
ferent sets of technologies across time. The beneﬁts of repeatedly
applying and making recombinations involving the technologies in
the core domain are twofold. First, polymath inventors ﬁnd that
they not only learn about new technological domains, but they
also gain a greater understanding of their own core technologies.
Second, the disciplined practice of repeatedly applying and inte-
grating the same technologies with new ones result in experience,
which makes it easier for the polymath inventors to make new
applications, even though the process may  not be a simple one.
As highlighted by a polymath inventor:
“When  you wanna make false shots, you’re not gonna do it by
going  to eat ice-cream. You’re gonna go out and shoot 300 false
shots  everyday. And I bet you if you do that for 5 years, you’re
gonna  get a whole lot better than you did when you ﬁrst started
and  you gotta keep asking those same questions and a lot of
times,  what always marvels me  is how we assume that discuss-
ions  happen at a corporation at 3M and we just jump in and
take  all our resources and start ﬂying. Did we really know what
we’re  going after, did we  really? Is this really the best way we
can  do that? Where else could we get resources from? What
others  areas would have interest in these type of things?”
Environment conditions conducive to polymaths. Polymath inven-
tors, through the process of developing and working with the
technologies in their core domain, and applying the technology to
new domain areas, often develop deep passion for their technolo-
gies, and strong beliefs about the potential of the technology to
bring value in different domains. This provides strong motivation
for the polymath inventors to continue their course of champi-
oning their technologies and applying them widely. In terms of
the organizational environment, 3M has publicly stated that 25
percent of its sales must be generated from products that did not
exist ﬁve years ago (Kunkel, 1997). The company also places sig-
niﬁcant emphasis on evaluating inventors’ contributions based on
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he commercial value that their inventions have generated. Hence,
ith 3M’s strong emphasis on R&D’s need to contribute to product
ales, this provides even more impetus for the polymath inventor
o ensure they are able to integrate and apply their technologies to
enerate commercial value to the organization.
. Theory and hypotheses
Next,  we discuss how the insights and ﬁndings from the quali-
ative study integrate with the concepts and theory from existing
iterature, generating a set of theoretical hypotheses that we later
est in a separate quantitative study. This will allow us to make
onclusions that are supported by theory, about how 3M lever-
ges inventors with different expertise proﬁles to bring value to
he organization.
The interview ﬁndings from the qualitative study revealed that
ndividuals often depended on creative recombinations of their
xisting knowledge to generate new inventions. This is consistent
ith Schumpeter (1934)’s view that innovation is the recombina-
ion of existing resources, in the form of existing ideas, materials
nd forces. We  thus draw on this literature, and we  also integrate
he ﬁndings and insights from the qualitative interviews with the
sychology of science literature, which discuss the role of indi-
idual cognition in facilitating the generation of novel ideas by
ndividuals (Weisberg, 1999), in order to create insights into the
ndividual psychological processes leading to scientiﬁc creativity
Feist and Gorman, 1998; Klahr and Simon, 1999).
.1. Dimensions of individuals’ expertise: breadth and depth
Prior  research tends to conceptualize depth and breadth of indi-
idual expertise as two ends of the same dimension, due to the
rade-offs required in investing the time to cultivate either special-
zed areas of expertise, or a broad range of expertise domains (Kim,
989; Schilling et al., 2003). As noted by Jones (2008), “given an
nvestment in time, one might become a generalist with modest
nowledge about multiple tasks or a specialist with deep knowl-
dge at a particular task”.
At the organizational level of analysis, however, Katila and Ahuja
2002) conceptualized the breadth and depth of a ﬁrm’s knowl-
dge as the scope (local versus distant) of the ﬁrm’s search efforts
nd the degree to which existing knowledge is exploited or reused
espectively. This conceptualization effectively treats the breadth
nd depth of a ﬁrm’s knowledge as two separate dimensions rather
han two ends of the same dimension. The idea that organizations
an effectively achieve both breadth and depth of knowledge is
onsistent with the ﬁnding that organizations often have loosely
oupled and differentiated subunits or individuals, each specializ-
ng in either knowledge search and exploration or knowledge reuse
nd exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006).
Our qualitative study shows that even at the individual level,
ne can consider breadth and depth of inventor expertise as two
eparate dimensions, rather than two ends of the same dimension,
s we found that there are a group of polymath 3M inventors who
ave both high breadth and high depth of expertise. These inven-
ors are not “jack of all trades and master of all trades”; rather,
he individuals have some knowledge of many technical domain
reas, but deep expertise in only one or a few core technical domain
reas. Effectively, these inventors have “T-shaped skills” – skills
hat are both deep (represented by the vertical part of the “T”) and
road (represented by the horizontal part of the “T”) (lansiti, 1993;
adhavan and Grover, 1998).
Our interviews show that the core expertise areas form the heart
f and foundation for the individual to apply his or her core exper-
ise to new domains. These inventors often passionately championFig. 1. Expertise proﬁles of individuals.
the technologies they invent in their core domain areas, and widely
apply and integrate the technologies in different domains, and at
the same time, learn about new domain areas. Prior studies in
cognitive psychology have established the associative nature of
knowledge – individuals comprehend and encode new knowledge
into memory by linking it to pre-existing knowledge components
(Ellis, 1965; Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). Hence, as shown in our
interviews, individuals build both breadth and depth of expertise by
anchoring themselves in one or a few core technical domain areas,
and understanding how their core domain expertise area interacts
with other disciplines. Thus individuals learn to recombine existing
components in novel ways while simultaneously building up new
connections and new cognitive nodes of knowledge. Once an indi-
vidual builds up a rich repertoire of knowledge components and
also constructs a dense scaffolding of strengthened links between
existing knowledge components and new knowledge components,
he or she can more easily integrate new knowledge components
into a large web  of existing knowledge components (Schilling et al.,
2003).
Fig. 1 shows how the two  dimensions of depth and breadth of
individual expertise interact to generate different archetypes of
expertise proﬁles. In the next section, we hypothesize about how
individuals with different expertise proﬁles will bring value to an
organization.
4.2. Hypotheses
Depth of expertise. Our interview study reveals how specialists
tend to approach the innovation process. First, the deep expertise
of specialists implies that they are excellent problem solvers, able
to provide high quality and detailed analysis of problems and solu-
tions. This is consistent with psychological research that has found
that people who are considered experts in a domain solve problems
better and faster than non-experts (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996).
Our interview ﬁndings also revealed that deep knowledge allows
specialists to be able to understand the fundamental principles
driving a particular domain or problem. The ability to understand
fundamental components and the relationships between them
enables specialists to effectively make recombinations of existing
components. Experiences gained experimenting with combina-
tions of different components teach them about the properties of
each component and enable them to make educated guesses about
potential outcomes and problems when they make new combi-
nations of the familiar components or use a component in a new
context. This enables individuals with greater depth of knowledge
to navigate a landscape with tightly coupled components and to
invent new recombinations that would have signiﬁcant impact on
a technical ﬁeld (Fleming, 2001).
Prior research has also shown that individuals with greater
depth of expertise are better able to make relevant inferences
about principles and abstractions that are not obvious from the
surface presentation of the problem (Chi et al., 1988). The ability
to go beyond the surface presentation of a problem, to identify
the underlying principles and assumptions, and to infer further
related knowledge is critical to advancing fundamental knowledge
that can create signiﬁcant technical impact. The ability to rec-
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xpertise to generate a coherent, complete and principled repre-
entation of a domain area (Chi et al., 1989). These experts can make
se of systematic solutions and analogical reasoning (Holyoak and
hagard, 1997) to solve novel problems, as opposed to depending
ompletely on trial and error (Mumford, 2000).
Hence, the inherent advantages afforded by deep expertise, cou-
led with the tendency for specialists to focus and persevere in the
ace of difﬁculties, solving problems associated with a technology,
ncrease the likelihood that specialists can generate highly impact-
ul technological inventions that would have signiﬁcant inﬂuence
n the technical domain. Hence, we hypothesize:
1. Individuals with greater depth of expertise in their core area
f expertise are more likely to be able to generate technically inﬂu-
ntial inventions.
Breadth of expertise. The ﬁndings of the interview study shows
hat generalists leverage their breadth of knowledge by applying
nd recombining their expertise in creative ways. This is in line
ith arguments from prior research. Simonton (2003), for example,
otes that a larger number of cognitive elements available for asso-
iation and the breadth of these elements increase the probability
f ﬁnding novel combinations amongst these elements. Research
n creativity also highlights that divergent-thinking, or the extent
o which individuals are able to generate a wide variety of ideas, is
ritical for creativity (Baer, 1993). Both Greve and Taylor (2000) and
atila and Ahuja (2002) found that expanding the scope of search
ncreases idea variety, creating more ways of combining knowledge
hat challenge the assumptions and beliefs constraining innovation.
ncreasing the number of cognitive elements increases the num-
er of options available to inventors for solving novel problems.
hese arguments highlight that breadth of expertise increase the
endency to generate a higher number of ideas.
Our interview ﬁndings show that while the focus on applica-
ions and recombinations of generalists are similar to the polymath
nventors, the difference is their focus on generating many different
ecombinations of different technologies, rather than recombina-
ions involving the same technologies that polymath inventors are
nchored in. This equips them with the ability to generate multiple
deas and inventions, although not necessarily the most impactful
r useful ones. This is because while breadth of knowledge enables
ndividuals to recombine disparate knowledge components, thus
enerating many novel ideas, it does not necessarily equip them
o select the most appropriate combinations that can generate the
ost inﬂuential or commercially worthwhile ideas. As noted by
oincaré (1921, p. 386), the key to invention is not in making a large
umber of “useless combinations” but “in making those which are
seful and which are only a small minority”. Hence, we  hypothe-
ize:
2. Individuals with greater breadth of expertise in many domain
reas are more likely to be able to generate more inventions.
Breadth and depth of expertise. While individuals with deep
xpertise are likely to generate technically inﬂuential inventions,
nd those with broad expertise are well-positioned to generate
any inventions, we argue that an inventor needs both breadth and
epth of expertise to have a successful career of innovating prod-
cts that generate revenue for the ﬁrm. Inventors with successful
areers create value for their organizations not only by generating
echnical inventions, but also by applying the inventions to one or
ore market needs and transforming the technical inventions into
seful products. Hence, it is not sufﬁcient for an inventor to come
p with a novel idea and patent it; that novel idea must be con-
erted into a real, commercially successful product. We argue that
he key to an innovator’s career success is the ability to structure
he transition from a novel idea to a successful product. To make
his transition, one needs to be able to recognize when a novel ideacy 43 (2014) 349– 366 357
has the potential to become a saleable product. More importantly,
inventors bring value to their organization by transitioning a novel
idea into a series of related products that can build upon each other
and have broad impact on an organization’s sales revenue.
Our  interview ﬁndings reveal that the polymath inventor draws
on both his breadth and depth of expertise to help evaluate ideas
and identify the most fruitful ideas to work with, and both dimen-
sions of expertise help him to identify novel ideas that have the
potential to bring commercial value to the ﬁrm. In addition, through
active championing of technologies in his/her core domain area,
the polymath inventor plays a key role in transitioning a novel
idea or invention into products that provide commercial value
to the ﬁrm. Both depth and breadth of knowledge are critical to
help the polymath inventor through this process. First, depth of
knowledge is critical for inventors to anticipate and solve prob-
lems that arise from integrating disparate areas and knowledge
components, as technological challenges increase proportionately
with the amount of knowledge components to be integrated (Katila
and Ahuja, 2002). Moreover, the innovation process is often uncer-
tain and risky (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). An innovator often has
to make hypotheses and assumptions about which technological
constraints can be overcome (sometimes in the face of ridicule
from other established scientists) to arrive at a breakthrough inno-
vation. An individual needs deep expertise in order to have the
audacity and conﬁdence to challenge well accepted assumptions
and constraints and to invest time and resources in doing so.
On  the other hand, depth of expertise also has its downside.
Individuals with deep but narrow expertise tend to pursue a sin-
gle technological trajectory, unable to adopt ideas and incorporate
innovation from other ﬁelds. When individuals become too focused
on examining only a few technological components, their inno-
vation potential may  be limited by the ﬁnite and restricted set
of connections they can derive from the small set of knowledge
components. Depth of expertise and experience also make experts
very aware of technological constraints, so much so that inventors
may sometimes forget that some constraints are only assumptions
and may  be tested with new technological advances. However,
as individuals gain breadth of knowledge, they learn how their
core expertise domain interacts with other components (Madhavan
and Grover, 1998), thus enabling them to not only learn about
new domain areas, but also learn new properties about their own
core area of expertise. Widening perspective enables innovators to
constantly question existing assumptions and generate different
ways of looking at a problem and prevents self-imposed biases and
stereotypes about ways that they and others conduct their work
(Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002).
Hence, individuals with both breadth and depth of expertise
can utilize their specialized knowledge and deep understanding
of a speciﬁc area and their broad exposure to new ideas and new
variations to generate unique combinations of a broad array of
components and work through the problems of integrating the
disparate components (Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). This com-
bination of expertise breadth and depth allows them to generate
technical inventions and also apply the inventions broadly in new
market areas, thus generating value for their corporation. We  thus
hypothesize:
H3. Individuals with greater depth of expertise in their core exper-
tise areas and breadth of expertise in many domain areas are more
likely to be successful in their careers with 3M.
5. Study 2: test of hypothesesTo  test our hypotheses, which were derived based on insights
from the interviews and the literature, we conducted a quanti-































































cases; those disagreements were resolved by discussion between
the two  raters. We  then compared the classiﬁcation of the inter-
viewees based on the coding of the interviews to the classiﬁcation58 W.F. Boh et al. / Resear
ombination of data sources. First, as 3M places signiﬁcant empha-
is on intellectual property protection, its research scientists ﬁle
atents extensively to protect their inventions. The patent data
erved as a good source of information for inventors’ expertise and
he impact they have on their technical domains. We  supplemented
he patent data with organizational data about individual inventors,
uch as their division, their organizational rank and whether they
ad received the Carlton Award, variables that provide key infor-
ation about the inventors’ career success in 3M.  The archival data
rom different sources allowed us to test our hypotheses quantita-
ively.
Patent data. Raw patent data for the analysis was obtained from
he Delphion database; it included a total of 11,411 U.S. utility
atents that were granted to 3M,  as of December 2006. The patent
pplication dates ranged from 1976 to 2006. A utility patent is one
hat protects a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
r composition of matter” (USPTO, 2009). Almost all US patents
re utility patents, and most social science research using patent
ata includes only utility patents (Fleming et al., 2007). As there
s no unique identiﬁer for each inventor in the patent database,
e adapted Singh (2005)’s algorithm (2005) to identify when two
atent records refer to the same inventor. We  regard two inventors
o be the same if and only if all of the following conditions hold: (1)
here was an exact match for the ﬁrst and last names; (2) the middle
nitials, if available, were the same; and (3) when the middle initial
eld was blank, the records also overlapped on at least 1 of the 3-
igit U.S. Patent Classiﬁcation (UPC) code. We  also checked the data
gainst the organizational workforce directory where applicable,
dentifying individuals with duplicate names and their respective
omain areas.
In  the following sections, we ﬁrst explain the measures used
or breadth and depth of inventors’ expertise. We  then explain the
nalyses conducted and measures used for each analytic set.
.1.  Measures of inventors’ expertise
We  used patent data to obtain measures of the breadth and
epth of inventors’ expertise. The U.S. Patent Ofﬁce organizes
ll technology into approximately 400 classes and 100,000 sub-
lasses; each class is known as the U.S. Patent Classiﬁcation (UPC).
ach patent is assigned to one or more UPC (Fleming et al., 2007).
ach UPC therefore represents a technological area that an inventor
orks in. Based on the UPC assignments to the patents published by
ach individual, we worked out the breadth and depth of expertise
or each inventor.2 The patent ofﬁce requires that patented ideas
e novel, unobvious, and useful. Our research assumes that if an
nventor has repeatedly created inventive patent claims in speciﬁc
ubject areas, the inventor has likely achieved a level of expertise
2 Prior literature has also used the UPCs of the forward citations of a patent to mea-
ure the diversity of a patent (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Jaffe et al., 1993), but
oing so effectively measures the inﬂuence of a patent, rather than the breadth of
he patent and hence the breadth of the inventor. On the other hand, prior literature
as  also used the technological classiﬁcations of the backward citations of patents
r  their search reports to calculate the diversity and depth of patents (Gruber et al.,
012). We chose to use the technological classiﬁcations of the patents generated by
nventors to calculate the breadth measures as we  felt that a patent is more accu-
ately classiﬁed with its own  technological class. UPC classiﬁcations are accorded
o patents based on the claims stated within the application document, one of the
ost important parts of the patent document. Hence, the UPCs are generally more
recise in describing the technological classes a patent belongs to, compared to the
echnological classes of the backward citations of a patent or its search report. As
e are measuring the breadth and depth of inventors expertise, we  require the
echnological classes to describe the patent as precisely as possible, whereas prior
esearch that have used backward citations was  calculating the breadth of tech-
ological recombinations achieved by a patent, and this was  used as an outcome
ariable  to indicate the extent to which an inventor has been successful in combining
ifferent  technologies.cy 43 (2014) 349– 366
in the ﬁeld. The expertise may  be in advancing the ﬁeld, in devel-
oping new combinations leveraging at least one area of expertise,
or both.
Breadth of expertise. Adopting the same measure used by Fleming
et al. (2007), we  measured an inventor’s breadth of experience
as the number of unique UPC codes assigned to the inventor’s
patents.3 Prior literature has used the Herﬁndahl index (HI)4 or
adapted versions of the HI, which measures the extent to which
an inventor’s patents are concentrated in one UPC, or equally dis-
tributed across all the UPCs, to measure the technological diversity
of ﬁrms or patents (Gruber et al., 2012; Lahiri, 2010). This measure,
however, is effectively a measure of both the breadth and depth of
a person’s expertise. A person who  has deep expertise would have
a high HI (close to one), whereas a person who  has broad expertise
would have a low HI (close to 1/N). Indeed, with the exception of
Gruber et al. (2012), most studies that have used this measure have
only examined the diversity of a ﬁrm’s knowledge or patent, but
not examined the depth of a ﬁrm’s knowledge or patents.
Depth  of expertise. As our conceptualization of depth of exper-
tise is about inventors’ expertise in their core domain areas, we
ﬁrst identiﬁed the inventor’s core domain area, which is deﬁned
as the UPC code in which the inventor publishes most frequently.5
We  then calculated the inventor’s depth of expertise as the total
number of patents the focal inventor has published in his or her
core area of expertise, divided by the inventor’s total number of
patents. This measure is adapted from the measure of concentration
ratio, and it effectively measures the share of patents published by
a focal inventor that is classiﬁed in the UPC code in which the focal
inventor publishes most frequently. We  conducted further sensi-
tivity analysis to examine how the results would change when we
deﬁned one’s core areas of expertise as the two or three UPC codes
in which an inventor publishes most frequently,6 and the results
remain unchanged.
Face  validity checks on expertise measures. We  used the inter-
views described in Study 1 to help verify the face validity of our
expertise measures. Based on the interviewees’ descriptions of
their areas of expertise and their characterizations of the breadth
and depth of their expertise, the ﬁrst author coded each inter-
viewee as a specialist, generalist or polymath inventor. A second
independent rater coded the same set of interviews. The inter-
rater agreement was 87.9. There was disagreement in only two3 One might also suggest that the number of technological classes (our current
breadth  measure) should be scaled by the number of patents, as breadth is easier to
produce for scientists with more patents. As the distribution of number of patents is
highly skewed, we scale the breadth measure with the log number of patents, which
is consistent with the inclusion of the log number of patents as a control variable.
Using  this normalized breadth measure provides consistent results with the results
presented in the paper.




1 , where Si is the proportion of an
inventor’s  patents in UPC i, and n is the total number of UPCs that the inventor has
worked in.
5 We conducted sensitivity analysis by using an alternative method of deﬁning
one’s  core expertise. In our current deﬁnition, we restricted core expertise to be in
predeﬁned numbers of areas. But different people could potentially have different
numbers  of core expertise. In this analysis, we  deﬁne core expertise to be the UPCs
in which individuals have published at least 50% of their patents, or UPCs in which
individuals have published at least 10 patents. Deﬁning core expertise as the UPCs in
which individuals have published at least a certain percentage of their patents caters
for individuals who may not have many patents. Deﬁning core expertise as UPCs in
which individuals have published at least 10 patents caters for individuals who may
have many patents. This analysis presents similar results as those presented in the
paper.
6 This is to cater for the possibility that an individual may  have more than one
area  of core expertise.
W.F. Boh et al. / Research Poli
Table  2
Descriptive statistics of clusters and interviewees.
No. of inventors Depth of expertise Breadth of expertise




















































published by an inventor in each three-year window period.
Analysis  3. The third set of analysis examined how the breadth
and depth of inventors’ expertise inﬂuenced the probability thatGeneralists 9 20.22 24.33
Polymaths 17 78.77 30.47
f the inventors based on the patent data. There was agreement
n the classiﬁcations in all but three cases, providing an inter-rater
greement of 81.8. Thus, there is reasonably strong evidence that
he measures used to calculate the breadth and depth of exper-
ise from the patent data were good indicators of the expertise of
ndividuals. Table 2 shows the expertise proﬁle of the interviewees.
.2. Dependent variables and levels of analysis
We  conducted three sets of analyses at three distinct levels
f analysis, with different dependent variables. In line with prior
esearch using patent data (Fleming et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2002), all
ariables were calculated by patent application date (or publication
ate).
Analysis 1. The ﬁrst set of analysis tests hypothesis 1 by exam-
ning how the breadth and depth of expertise of the inventors of
 patent affected the forward citations of the patent. The depend-
nt variable for this analysis is the number of forward citations
er patent as of 2007 (#Forward Cites). Forward citations are com-
only used as proxies for the technical impact of a patent (Hall
t al., 2001). A patent with higher forward citations shows a higher
evel of technical advancement and signiﬁes a greater impact and
nﬂuence on a technical domain (Carpenter et al., 1981). The inde-
endent variables are the average breadth and average depth of
he inventors of the focal patent, based on the patents published
y the inventors prior to the ﬁling of the focal patent. As controls,
e included variables that have been included in similar analysis
f patent forward citations by Fleming and Sorenson (2001) and
leming (2001). Table 3 provides a description of the control vari-
bles included in the analysis, and Table 4 shows the descriptive
tatistics and correlations of the variables included in the analysis.
As the dependent variable takes on integer values, researchers
ypically make use of Poisson models to analyze such count data.
dopting a similar approach with patents as the unit of analysis
Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), we estimated a neg-
tive binomial model using the PROC GENMOD procedure in SAS.
s each individual needs to have accumulated a number of patents
efore his or her expertise proﬁle can be accurately assessed, we
onsidered only the patents ﬁled by inventors who  had at least 5
atents prior to ﬁling the focal patent. A total of 5826 patents met
his criterion.7 Table 5 reports estimates of the effects of indepen-
ent variables on each patent’s forward citations.
Analysis 2. The second set of analysis examined the number
f inventions generated by each inventor over a three-year win-
ow period. This analysis tests hypothesis 2, to examine how an
7 We adopted the approach of Fleming et al. (2007) to conduct further analysis to
ontrol for the possibility of selection bias. We  ﬁrst estimated a ﬁrst-stage selection
odel (Heckman, 1976) to estimate the probability that the focal patent will have
t least one inventor who  published 5 or more patents prior to the patent. Using
ata  from all observations, we estimated the ﬁrst stage selection model using the
ollowing predictors: (1) number of inventors on the patent; (2) number of UPC
he focal patent has been classiﬁed in; and (3) the application year of the patent.
he  inverse mills ratio generated in the ﬁrst stage, which serves as a control for
he probability that the focal patent will have at least one inventor who  published
 or more patents prior to the patent, is then entered into the estimation model
sed to test the hypotheses (Fleming et al., 2007). As the lambda coefﬁcient was  not
igniﬁcant, and the results did not differ with the inclusion of the ratio, we reported
he results that did not include the inverse mills ratio.cy 43 (2014) 349– 366 359
inventor’s breadth and depth of expertise at the beginning of a
time period inﬂuences the number of patents that s/he gener-
ates in that period. Similar to Fleming et al. (2007), we  split each
inventor’s career into three-year periods. The model analyzed nine
window periods: 1976–1978, 1979–1981, 1982–1984, 1985–1987,
1988–1990, 1991–1993, 1994–1996, 1997–1999, and 2000–2002.
Redeﬁning the window periods, with the starting window period
as 1977–1979 and 1978–1980, did not change the results.
The  dependent variable for this analysis is the number of patents
that the focal inventor has published during the three-year window
period (#Patentst). The independent variables are the breadth and
depth of the focal inventor based on patents published prior to the
beginning of the window period (Year t). As controls, we  included
the following variables: (1) #Years: number of years since the focal
inventor has ﬁrst published his/her ﬁrst patent; (2) #Patents: num-
ber of patents published by the focal inventor prior to Year t, and (3)
#Co-inventors: number of co-inventors for patents published prior
to Year t. We  logged the #Patents and #Co-inventors to achieve
a normal distribution as the two  variables were highly skewed.
We also included a dummy  for each UPC code that took on the
value of 1 if that UPC code was  the most frequent UPC code that the
focal inventor published in prior to year t, to control for the pos-
sibility that researchers in some domain areas may  generate more
patents than others. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics and
correlations for the variables used in Analysis 2.
As  the analysis was for a panel dataset with count data as the
dependent variable, we used the GLIMMIX Procedure in SAS that
allowed us to specify random effects and a multi-level structure
with repeated measures nested within individuals. PROC GLIMMIX
performs estimation for generalized linear mixed models, which
extend the class of generalized linear models by incorporating ran-
dom effects. Generalized linear models are used when the data are
uncorrelated, but when observations exhibit some form of depend-
ency. In our case, when repeated observations are taken from the
same individual across time periods, the models ﬁt by the GLIMMIX
procedure extend the generalized linear models by incorporating
correlations among the responses (Schabenberger, 2005). At the
same time, it can model non-normal response distributions, includ-
ing the negative binomial distribution when the dependent variable
is in the form of count data.
For  each period beginning in Year t, we  excluded observations
from individuals who had fewer than 5 patents prior to Year t,
because each individual needs to have accumulated a number
of patents before his or her expertise proﬁle can be accurately
assessed.8 Based on this criterion, the dataset for this analysis
included 3076 observations for 1249 individuals.9 Table 7 reports
estimates of the effects of key variables on the number of patents8 Further sensitivity analysis changing the criterion to four or six patents show
that  the results remain unchanged (for all three sets of analyses).
9 Similar to analysis 1, we conducted further analysis to control for the possibility
of  selection bias. We ﬁrst estimated a ﬁrst-stage selection model (Heckman, 1976) to
estimate the probability that an individual, at the beginning of a time period, would
have accumulated 5 or more patents. Using data from all observations, we estimated
the ﬁrst stage selection model with the following predictors: (1) number of years
since the focal inventor has ﬁrst published his/her ﬁrst patent; (2) the number of
co-inventors prior to year t; (3) the average number of co-inventors per patent for
patents published prior to year t; and (4) the UPC code in which the focal inventor
publishes  most frequently. The inverse mills ratio generated in the ﬁrst stage was
then entered in the model testing our hypotheses in the second stage. As highlighted
by  Fleming et al. (2007), the ratio serves as a proxy to control for the probability that
the inventor will have more than 5 patents prior to each time period. As the lambda
coefﬁcient  was  not signiﬁcant, and the results did not differ with the inclusion of
the ratio, we reported the results without the inclusion of the inverse mills ratio.
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Table  3
Description of control variables included in predicting forward citations of patents.
Variable Measure
1. Mean Technology (Tech Mean) We calculated the expected citations of technically similar patents – to control for differences in expected citations
across patents in different UPCs. We begin by calculating the average number of citations that patents in each UPC,
published in each year, receives as of 2006 – this serves as the proxy for the expected forward citation for patents
published  in each UPC in each year. Based on the UPC that the focal patent is classiﬁed in and the application year of
the patent, we  calculate the average expected forward citations for the focal patent. For example, if class 1 patents in
year 1990 averages 3.0 cites per patent and class 18 patents in year 1990 averages 5.0 cites per patent, a patent
published  in year 1990, classiﬁed in one class of 1 and two  classes of 18 would have an expected citation count of
(1/3) × 3.0 + (2/3) × 5.0 = 4.33
2.  No of Prior Art Citations (Backward
Cites)
Number of prior art citations made by the focal patent.
3.  Single-Class Dummy  (Single Class) Takes on a value of 1 if the focal patent is assigned to only one UPC.
4. No of subclasses (#subclasses) Number of focal patents’ sub patent classes.
5.  Newest UPC Minimum number of previous times that a UPC has been used to classify a patent, amongst the focal patent’s UPCs
(divided by 1000 for scaling).
6. No of patent classes (#UPC) The number of UPCs that the focal patent has been classiﬁed in.
7. Average number of patents by
inventors (Avg. #Patents)
Average  number of patents published by inventors of a focal patent, prior to Year t.
8.  No of inventors with 5 or more patents
prior to Year t (#Inv ≥ 5Patents)
As we  only measured the expertise of inventors who had 5 or more patents, we included a variable measuring the
number of inventors who  had 5 or more patents prior to Year t.
9. No of inventors with less than 5
patents prior to Year t (#Inv < 5Patents)
Number of inventors who had less than 5 patents prior to Year t.
10. No of yrs since application (No Yrs) Number of years that has elapsed since application year, as of 2007.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for variables predicting forward citations of patents.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. #FwdCites 11.96 18.60
2.  Avg. Breadth 10.47 5.42 −0.029
3.  Avg. Depth 0.63 0.18 0.020 −0.541
4. Tech Mean 11.02 6.24 0.362 −0.122 0.065
5. Backward Cites 33.54 32.09 −0.072 0.079 −0.017 −0.117
6.  Single Class 0.41 0.49 −0.075 −0.133 0.073 0.041 −0.042
7.  #Subclasses 5.99 4.41 0.066 0.157 −0.072 −0.072 0.048 −0.394
8.  Newest UPC 9.489 9.785 −0.181  −0.027 0.029 −0.229 0.131 0.411 −0.125
9. #UPC 2.03 1.18 0.091 0.177 −0.099 −0.045 0.011 −0.729 0.563 −0.372
10.  Avg. #Patents 12.85 8.73 −0.156 0.647 −0.184 −0.264 0.248 −0.042 0.065 0.128 0.038
11.  #Inv < 5Patents 1.35 1.43 0.047 −0.033 −0.021 0.077 0.073 0.032 −0.019 0.073 −0.029 −0.059
12.  #Inv ≥ 5Patents 1.78 1.18 −0.100 0.133 −0.038 −0.207 0.328 −0.029 0.044 0.128 0.011 0.289 −0.014
13. No Yrs 10.51 6.29 0.355 −0.034 0.048 0.399 −0.376 −0.065 0.043 −0.388 0.102 −0.334 −0.102 −0.314
Note. Correlations > |0.025| are signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
Table  5
Results of analysis predicting forward citations of patents.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −0.022 (0.088) −0.046 (0.099) −0.105 (0.100)
Tech  mean 0.089*** (0.003) 0.089*** (0.003) 0.091*** (0.003)
Backward  cites 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
Single  class −0.123** (0.046) −0.122** (0.046) −0.125** (0.046)
#Subclasses  0.012** (0.004) 0.012** (0.004) 0.013** (0.004)
Newest  UPC −0.003 (0.002) −0.003 (0.002) −0.002 (0.002)
#UPC  0.020 (0.021) 0.021 (0.021) 0.022 (0.021)
Avg.  #Patents −0.007*** (0.002) −0.007* (0.003) −0.007* (0.003)
#Inv < 5Patents 0.080*** (0.011) 0.081*** (0.011) 0.079*** (0.011)
#Inv  ≥ 5Patents 0.049** (0.015) 0.049** (0.015) 0.054*** (0.015)
Application  year 0.093*** (0.004) 0.093*** (0.004) 0.094*** (0.004)
Avg.  breadth 0.002 (0.005) −0.002 (0.005)
Avg.  depth 0.302** (0.105) 0.187+ (0.111)
Avg. breadth * avg. depth −0.052** (0.016)
Deviance  6569 6563 6558
Deviance  difference (Dev) 6** 5**
Note. Standard errors are provided in parentheses; all signiﬁcance tests are two-tailed, with signiﬁcance indicated with the following conventions: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p  < 0.001.
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Table  6
Descriptive statistics for variables predicting no of patents generated in a 3-year period.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5
1. #Patentst 2.86 3.39
2. Breadth 9.52  5.48 0.24
3.  Depth 0.64 0.20 −0.07 −0.51
4.  #Years 12.41 6.82 −0.09 0.33 −0.22





























*6. ln#Co-inventors 2.02 1.21 0.2
ote: Correlations > |0.03| are signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
ndividuals would have successful careers in 3M,  providing a test
or hypothesis 3. To assess whether an individual has a successful
areer in the corporation, we used two 3M organizational variables
hat indicates the contribution of inventors toward products and
echnological platforms that bring in signiﬁcant sales and proﬁts
or the ﬁrm: (1) the organizational rank of the inventor in 3M;  and
2) whether the individual has been given the Carlton Award, the
restigious “Nobel Prize” of 3M (Govindarajan and Lang, 2002).
Organizational  rank. Technical employees in 3M are ranked on
n organizational scale ranging from T1 to T7. For research scien-
ists, most individuals with PhDs enter the organization at level
3. The T7 level refers to corporate scientists, who represent the
ighest-ranked research scientists in the company. Especially for
romotion to the top two echelons – the research scientists most
alued by the company, 3M places signiﬁcant emphasis on evalu-
ting inventors’ contributions based on the commercial value that
heir inventions have generated. Based on our interviews with 3M
esearch scientists, 31 of the 33 employees interviewed said that
he key criterion to achieve organizational ranks T6 and T7 is the
mount of sales that the research scientist generates for the organi-
ation through his or her inventions. For example, one interviewee
oted:
“Sales  numbers are a big thing, especially [for] promotions at T6
and  T7 levels, I mean you deﬁnitely have to have a contribution
that  is very strong and contributed to projects that have made
some  money.” (T6 Research Scientist)
Another interviewee provides a good overview of the differ-
nt types of criteria affecting promotion for individuals at different
rganizational ranks:
“Mainly the advancement of a person from T3 to T4 depends on
their  ability to have demonstrated that they can work collabo-
ratively  on a project with others in the company and that it has
advanced  to a stage where maybe some patents will be ﬁled,
maybe  there’s a business unit that is expressing some interest
in  it. . . And then to a T5, just probably more demonstrations of
that  in other areas. Advancing still to higher levels (T6 and T7),
able 7
esults of analysis predicting no of patents generated by an inventor in each period.
Model 1 
Intercept −0.531*** (0.109) 
#Years  −0.033*** (0.003) 
ln#Patents  0.474*** (0.049) 
ln#Co-inventors  0.087*** (0.022) 
Application  year *** 
Most  frequent UPCs *** 
Breadth  
Depth 
Breadth  * depth 
Deviance  (−2log likelihood) 12,276 
Deviance  difference (Dev) 
ote. Standard errors are provided in parentheses; all signiﬁcance tests are two-tailed, with
**p  < 0.001.0.32 −0.20 0.03 0.49
really the sales you can account for becomes the key factor.” (T4
Research  Scientist)
A review of the forms the human resource division requires as
part of the promotion review packet further veriﬁed that individ-
uals wishing to be considered for promotion to levels T6 and T7
had to indicate the ﬁnancial impact they brought to the ﬁrm as a
key component of the evaluation. The form required researchers
to state the products their inventions contributed to, the corre-
sponding sales amount and the role that the individual played in
generating the product. A corporate scientist involved in the pro-
motion process explained that it was not sufﬁcient for an individual
to successfully convert inventions into a single highly successful
product. Rather, researchers need to be able to show consistent
success in bringing their inventions to the market and thus con-
tributing signiﬁcantly to the revenue of the organization through
several innovative products. Hence, an inventor’s organizational
rank was  a good measure of that person’s career success in the
corporation and also an indicator of his or her continued suc-
cess at generating commercially successful innovations. Based on
these ﬁndings, we used the organizational rank of the inventor to
proxy the career success of the individual as an innovator. Speciﬁ-
cally, we differentiate between individuals who are ranked “T3–T5”
(Rank = 1), “T6” (Rank = 2) and “T7” (Rank = 3) I Individuals ranked
below T3 are seldom included in patents; hence they do not appear
in our dataset. We  made this distinction because promotion to T6
and T7 depended heavily on the business impact of their inven-
tions, while promotion from levels T3 to T5 depended on many
factors other than their business impact.
Carlton Award. To supplement this measure, we  also included
a measure of whether the inventor has received the Carlton
Award, which is the highest form of recognition that 3M can
provide its technical employees. It is usually awarded to employ-
ees who have made major technical contributions to technologies
or products that generated signiﬁcant sales and impact for the com-
pany. The award is sometimes nicknamed 3M’s Nobel Prize for
technical employees. The criteria for the award state that tech-
nical contributions “may be in the form of inventions, product
Model 2 Model 3
−0.306* (0.138) −0.321* (0.139)
−0.035*** (0.003) −0.035*** (0.003)
0.404*** (0.058) 0.405*** (0.058)
0.075*** (0.023) 0.076*** (0.023)
*** ***
*** ***
0.011* (0.005) 0.011* (0.006)




 signiﬁcance indicated with the following conventions: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
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Table  8
Descriptive statistics for variables predicting rank of inventors as of year 2007.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Inventor rank 1.19 0.47
2.  Award 0.04 0.20 0.66
3.  Breadth 9.19 5.16 0.32 0.22
4. Depth 0.63 0.20 −0.08 −0.02 −0.47
5. #Years2007 19.97 9.43 0.25 0.19 0.27 −0.15
6. R&D 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.11 0.18 −0.19 −0.02
7.  ln#Patents2007 2.27 0.58 0.35 0.27 0.67 −0.15 0.11 0.10
8.  ln#Co-inventors2007 2.36 0.92 0.19 0.13 0.38 −0.21 −0.25 0.07 0.55


















































10.  #Years Recent Patent2007 6.34 5.53 −0.03 −0.02 
ote. Correlations > |0.06| are signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
evelopment, process improvements, new material technologies,
ew technology platforms, fundamental understanding, technical
upport, technical service, or technical leadership exempliﬁed by
ision and sponsorship for new products and technologies or by
upport of others embarking in new technical directions”, and these
ontributions must “have signiﬁcantly and positively impacted
M’s business performance”.
As  we were able to obtain the organizational rank of the inven-
ors and the Carlton Award winners only as of 2007, we  conducted
he third analysis as a cross-sectional analysis as of year 2007 with
ndividuals as the unit of analysis. The independent variables are
he inventors’ knowledge breadth and depth, based on the patents
ublished by the inventors prior to Year 2007. We  included several
ontrol variables, including (1) the total number of patents pub-
ished by each inventor prior to year 2007 (#Patents2007); (2) the
ocal inventor’s total number of co-inventors prior to year 2007
#Co-inventors2007); (3) whether the inventor was in the corpo-
ate R&D group of 3M as of 2007 (R&D); and (4) the number of years
ince the focal inventor had ﬁrst published his or her ﬁrst patent
s of 2007 (#Years2007); (5) the average number of co-inventors
er patent for patents published prior to year 2007 (Avg. #Co-
nventor2007); and (6) the number of years since the inventor has
ublished his or her most recent patent as of 2007 (#Years Recent
atent2007). Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics and correla-
ions of the variables included in the analysis.
As inventors’ rank is ordinal data with three levels, we  applied
he ordered probit regression analysis to predict inventors’ rank.
hether an individual has received the Carlton Award is a binary
ariable; hence we applied the logistic regression to predict the
robability that an individual would receive the Carlton Award.
imilar to prior analyses, we considered only inventors who had
t least 5 patents prior to 2007 (total of 1162 inventors).10 Table 9
eports estimates of the effects of the above variables on the
ank of each inventor, and Table 10 reports estimates of the
ffects of the variables on the probability of winning the Carlton
ward.10 We also used Heckman’s (1976) two-stage model to correct for sample selection
ias. Using data from all observations, we estimated the ﬁrst stage selection model
sing the following predictors: (1) whether the inventor was  in the corporate R&D
roup of 3M (R&D); (2) the number of years since the focal inventor had ﬁrst pub-
ished his or her ﬁrst patent; (3) the total number of co-inventors with whom t the
ocal inventor had published patents prior to year 2007; (4) the average number of
PC codes per patent for patents published prior to year 2007; and (5) the UPC code
hat the inventor published most frequently in prior to year 2007. The ﬁrst stage
election model generated an inverse mills ratio, which serves as a control for the
robability that the focal inventor has published ﬁve or more patents prior to Year
007. The ratio was then entered into the estimation model used to test the hypothe-
es  (Fleming et al., 2007). As the results did not differ with the inclusion of the ratio
which was  also insigniﬁcant), we reported the results without the inclusion of the
nverse mills ratio.0.11 0.08 0.61 −0.04 −0.33 −0.55 −0.47
5.3. Results
For all three analyses, we used a step-wise approach to present
our results. Model 1 was ﬁrst estimated with only the control vari-
ables. Model 2 then added the main variables related to inventors’
expertise. Finally, we included the interaction term for breadth and
depth of inventors’ expertise.11 We  examined the signiﬁcance of
the incremental variance explained by examining the differences
between the deviance statistics (dev) for each pair of nested mod-
els. dev is twice the negative log-likelihood, and has a chi-square
distribution with the difference in number of parameters between
models to be estimated as the degrees of freedom.12
Predicting patent forward citations. We  ﬁrst examined how
inventors’ expertise inﬂuenced their ability to generate technically
inﬂuential inventions. Table 5 shows that inventors’ depth of exper-
tise signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced inventor’s average forward citations
(Table 5, Model 2,  ˇ = 302, p < 0.01). This provides support for H1,
which states that individuals with greater depth of expertise are
more likely to generate technically inﬂuential innovations. Inter-
estingly, Table 5 also shows that inventors with both high depth
and high breadth of expertise appear to be unable to achieve their
potential in creating technically inﬂuential inventions (Table 5,
Model 3,  ˇ = −0.052, p < 0.01). This may  occur because – when it
came to generating technically inﬂuential inventions – depth of
expertise was  critical to focus the inventors’ energy and efforts,
while broad expertise may  have been a distraction rather than an
advantage.
Predicting number of patents generated. Next, we examined how
an inventor’s expertise proﬁle inﬂuenced his or her ability to gen-
erate more inventions in the form of patents. Table 7 shows that
inventors with greater breadth of expertise tend to have more
patents in each time period (Table 7, Model 2,  ˇ = 0.011, p < 0.05),
providing support for H2. Neither inventors’ depth of expertise
(Table 7, Model 2,  ˇ = −0.125, p > 0.10) nor the interaction between
breadth and depth of expertise (Table 7, Model 3,  ˇ = −0.014,
p > 0.10) signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the number of patents per period.
Predicting inventors’ organizational rank and probability of win-
ning the Carlton Award. We  then examined how inventors’ expertise
inﬂuenced their career success, an indication of the value they
brought to their organizations by converting their inventions into
commercially successful products. Using inventors’ organizational
rank as the dependent variable, Table 9 shows that inventors’
11 The signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients generated by the probit, logistic and neg-
ative binomial analyses (Tables 5, 9 and 10) are tested with the Wald statistic is:
(ˆ − 0)
2
/var(ˆ), which is compared against a chi-squared distribution.
12 All models were inspected for multicollinearity using the condition index and
the  variance inﬂation factors. All the models have variance inﬂation factors less than
four, and condition index less than 22. As can be seen in Tables 5, 7, 9 and 10, there
were  also no sign ﬂips with the additions of variables to the model. These provide
evidence  that there are no signiﬁcant multicollinearity issues with the analyses.
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Table  9
Results of analysis predicting rank of inventors as of year 2007.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 1 −4.814*** (0.335) −4.634*** (0.393) −4.539*** (0.397)
Intercept  2 1.046*** (0.084) 1.053*** (0.084) 1.059*** (0.085)
#Years2007 0.048*** (0.007) 0.049*** (0.007) 0.049*** (0.007)
R&D  0.343**(0.113) 0.369** (0.116) 0.369** (0.116)
ln#Patents2007 0.409**(0.125) 0.291* (0.147) 0.272+ (0.148)
Ln  #Co-inventors2007 0.418** (0.130) 0.455*** (0.134) 0.459*** (0.136)
Avg.  #Co-inventor2007 −0.131* (0.061) −0.137* (0.061) −0.142* (0.062)
#Years  Recent Patent2007 −0.016 (0.013) −0.019  (0.013) −0.019  (0.013)
Breadth  0.016 (0.014) 0.028+ (0.015)
Depth 0.580+ (0.307) 0.563+ (0.310)
Breadth * depth 0.124* (0.049)
Deviance  (−2log likelihood) 956 952 940
Deviance  difference (Dev) 4 11***
Note. Standard errors are provided in parentheses; all signiﬁcance tests are two-tailed, with signiﬁcance indicated with the following conventions: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p  < 0.001.
Table 10
Results of analysis predicting Carlton award as of year 2007.
Model 1 Model  2 Model 3
Intercept −10.331*** (1.006) −10.210*** (1.176) −10.003*** (1.194)
#Years2007 0.123*** (0.020) 0.128*** (0.020) 0.129*** (0.020)
ln#Patents2007 1.094*** (0.322) 0.920* (0.391) 0.822* (0.399)
Ln #Co-inventors2007 0.654+ (0.348) 0.769* (0.364) 0.769* (0.368)
Avg. #Co-inventor2007 −0.047 (0.185) −0.081  (0.188) −0.063  (0.190)
#Years  Recent Patent2007 0.029 (0.031) 0.023 (0.032) 0.022 (0.032)
Breadth  0.018 (0.030) 0.056 (0.034)
Depth  1.496+ (0.859) 1.211 (0.883)
Breadth  * depth 0.231* (0.100)
Deviance (−2log likelihood) 426 422 411


























eote. Standard errors are provided in parentheses; all signiﬁcance tests are two-tailed
**p  < 0.001.
readth of expertise did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their organiza-
ional rank (Table 9, Model 2,  ˇ = 0.016, p > 0.10), while inventors’
epth of expertise had only a marginally signiﬁcant inﬂuence
Table 9, Model 2,  ˇ = 0.580, p < 0.10). Inventors with both high
readth and depth of expertise, however, were more likely to hold
igher organizational rank (Table 9, Model 3,  ˇ = 0.124, p < 0.05).
Next, we predicted the probability that inventors would receive
he Carlton Award, using that award to proxy the value that each
nventor brought to the organization. The results are similar to
hose predicting rank. Table 10 shows that inventors’ breadth
f expertise did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their probability of
inning the award (Table 10, Model 2,  ˇ = 0.018, p > 0.10), while
nventors’ depth of expertise had only a marginally signiﬁcant inﬂu-
nce (Table 10, Model 2,  ˇ = 1.49, p < 0.10). Inventors with both high
readth and depth of expertise, however, were more likely to win
he Carlton Award (Table 10, Model 3,  ˇ = 0.231, p < 0.05). Both sets
f analyses provide support for H3, which states that individuals
ith greater depth and breadth of expertise are more likely to
chieve career success in 3M.
. Discussion
The results of our analysis show that an inventor’s expertise
roﬁle is important in inﬂuencing his or her success as both an
nventor and an innovator. Our ﬁndings advance insights offered
y previous research on expertise and innovation in several ways.
First,  we presented both the theoretical arguments and empir-
cal evidence to show that individuals’ breadth and depth of
xpertise should be conceptualized as two separate and orthogonal signiﬁcance indicated with the following conventions: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
dimensions.  Indeed, the traditional conceptualization of the renais-
sance man  – who  has deep expertise in many different domain areas
– is an ideal that is difﬁcult to achieve. What we found, however,
was that the polymath inventors in 3M had deep expertise in one or
more core domain areas and then they applied this expertise widely
by integrating it with other technologies in new domain areas, thus
gaining expertise in the new domain areas.
We conducted additional analysis (see Appendix B online)
to examine how generalist, specialist and polymath inventors
changed in their expertise proﬁle over time. Our analysis showed
that specialists’ breadth and depth remain relatively unchanged
across time. Polymath inventors typically began their careers by
specializing, maintaining high depth and low breadth of exper-
tise. As we  had conceptualized, over time, their breadth increased
and their depth decreased marginally. Generalist inventors, on the
other hand, start with a lower depth of expertise, which steadily
decreases over time as their gain expertise in more domain areas.
Overall, this analysis shows that our conceptualization of how a
polymath inventor gained expertise over time – starting out spe-
cializing in their core areas of expertise, and learning new areas as
they start to apply their core expertise to new areas – appeared to
be veriﬁed by the data.
A  recent study by Jones et al. (2008) found that increasing tech-
nological progress has led to an increase in the amount of education
and depth of expertise required before scientists can generate their
ﬁrst invention. The requirement for depth of expertise in each
discipline increases as technological progress amplify the stock
of knowledge that innovators must be aware of and build upon
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oints to the tendency that inventors will become more specialized,
r they will require the help of other specialists if they need to
ntegrate knowledge from other ﬁelds (Jones, 2011). It also makes
t increasingly costly to master several different areas of knowl-
dge and expertise. As a result, the proverbial Renaissance Men  are
xpected to become even scarcer.
Interpreted in the context of these ﬁndings, our results are even
ore signiﬁcant in the following ways. First, our results highlight a
ay that specialists can expand their knowledge to become poly-
aths – by anchoring themselves in their core technologies and
pply and integrate these technologies with new areas, thus also
earning about new technological domains. This shows that the
ncrease in the initial hurdle for invention may  not only lead to
arrow specialization of expertise by inventors, but also provide
he incentive for these inventors to leverage on their inventions
hrough wide application and integration with other technolo-
ies. Second, our study of 3M inventors show that a corporate
nvironment like 3M’s can be conducive to cultivate generalists
nd polymaths, due to the diversity of business, the emphasis on
ales, and the philosophy that the company, rather than individ-
al business units, owned the technology. As highlighted in prior
esearch, the need for generalists and polymaths will increase as
pecialization narrows, as those who span areas of knowledge
ill not only improve communication between specialist team
embers, but will also be able to effectively broker and inte-
rate multiple technologies. Hence, there is scope to learn from
n organization like 3M how generalists and polymaths can be
ultivated.
Second, we recognize that becoming a successful inventor, who
reates technically important inventions, require different charac-
eristics than those needed to become a successful innovator, who
rings value to a commercial organization through the revenue
ontribution of his or her inventions. Prior research on innovation
ends to focus only on the technical success of an invention or an
nventor (Audia and Goncalo, 2007; Fleming et al., 2007) – exam-
ning the forward citations or novelty of inventions. Our results
how that breadth of expertise helps an inventor to generate many
nventions, but depth of expertise helps an inventor to generate
echnically inﬂuential inventions. Both breadth and depth of exper-
ise are required for an inventor to be successful and valued in a
ommercial corporation.
While  one may  argue that it is intuitive to expect that those
ith both breadth and depth of expertise (polymaths) will be more
uccessful that those with only breadth (generalists) or only depth
specialists) of expertise, we argued and showed, that inventors
ith different expertise proﬁles – generalists, specialists and poly-
aths – have different impacts on the organization. We  conducted
dditional analysis (see Appendix C online) to show that it was
ot a case of the more the better. Rather, different inventors con-
ributed to 3M in different ways. The specialists contributed to
M by producing the most technologically inﬂuential inventions.
he generalists contributed by producing many ideas and patents.
he polymaths contributed not only by generating inventions, but
pplying these inventions widely to multiple parts of the organi-
ation, integrating with multiple technologies, thus becoming the
ost valued scientists of 3M.
While prior research on the psychology of science has provided
ich insights into the individual psychological processes leading to
reativity in science, this research does not focus on the concrete
utcomes of individuals’ cognitive differences. Prior research has
lso only examined the outcomes of individual depth or breadth
f expertise as a single dimension. We  thus contribute to this area
f research by explaining how individuals with different expertise
roﬁles approach the innovation process differently, and how their
xpertise proﬁles inﬂuence their success in generating inventions
nd innovations.cy 43 (2014) 349– 366
Third, by examining the case of 3M in depth and studying in
detail the inventors’ expertise proﬁles, how they approach the
innovation process, how that inﬂuences the value they bring to the
ﬁrm, as well as characterizing the 3M practices and aspects of the
environment that cultivate different types of inventors, we provide
detailed information about how a successful and innovative ﬁrm
effectively manages its inventors and how the various organization
practices inﬂuence the value that individuals bring to the ﬁrm.
6.1.  Implications for practice
Our  study has several implications for practice. First, the iden-
tiﬁcation of inventors with different types of expertise proﬁles
(specialists, generalists, and polymaths) demonstrates that an orga-
nization’s most valuable inventors can come in different shapes and
sizes. A key take away for practitioners, therefore, is that organiza-
tions should not necessarily cultivate all their inventors to become
polymath inventors. Instead, an organization should build an eco-
system made up of specialist, generalist and polymath inventors.
Organizations can also consider these archetypes when they make
hiring decisions for inventors. An individual with diverse interests,
who likes to work on different and new things, may  be a good candi-
date for a generalist, whereas an individual with impeccable focus
and perseverance to keep working on a single problem could be a
potential specialist. As for potential polymath inventors, we sus-
pect such individuals would need to be cultivated, which means
that organizations need to provide room for individuals to develop
both breadth and depth simultaneously, if they have the inclination
to do so.
Our  ﬁndings also highlight the need for individual inventors to
recognize their expertise proﬁles and their corresponding strengths
and weaknesses. It is important for individuals to recognize that
their expertise enables them to contribute in distinct ways to the
organization; hence they should approach the innovation process
in ways that effectively leverage their strengths and complement
their weaknesses. Our qualitative interviews identiﬁed strategies
that were particularly useful for individuals with different expertise
proﬁles, which provide signiﬁcant practical implications to individ-
ual inventors. For specialists, one may  have assumed that specialists
should continue to work in the areas where they were trained in
order to leverage the deep technical knowledge that their train-
ing and education provide. Yet we  found that specialists who bring
the most value to the ﬁrm are those who  have skills that are val-
ued by the ﬁrm. Hence, specialists should be willing to learn and
develop new areas of expertise and entrench themselves as experts
in the areas of expertise most required by the ﬁrm. Generalists, on
the other hand, should focus on ways to bring value to the ﬁrm by
focusing on applications of technologies, and by developing a set of
fundamental skills that they are able to bring across domains, even
while they move often from one domain to another. Finally, poly-
maths get the most out of both their breadth and depth of expertise
when they leverage their expertise to evaluate the potential of
ideas, and to champion technologies in their core domains for wide
application, integrating with technologies in multiple domains.
In  addition, it is important for managers to recognize the
archetypes that characterize the particular inventors they manage,
leveraging their strengths and managing their weaknesses accord-
ingly. Our qualitative study provides signiﬁcant insights into the
organizational environment that are conducive to inventors of dif-
ferent proﬁles. These insights provide some guidance to managers
and ﬁrms on managing inventors of different archetypes. Speciﬁ-
cally, specialists need to be given the space and time to work on
potentially high impact inventions, and be given chances to fail in
the process. Generalists, on the other hand, ﬂourish when they have
the opportunity to work on a broad range of related domains and in
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ost incentive for polymaths to develop and ﬂourish when they put
mphasis on the importance for inventors to generate sales from
heir inventions, thus providing the impetus for inventors to get the
ost out of inventions in their core domains via wide applications
nd integrations with other technologies.
.2. Limitations
The ﬁndings of this study should be interpreted within some
imitations. First, our measures and conceptualizations of breadth
nd depth of expertise focus on inventors’ knowledge in technical
reas. Our interviews highlighted other types of knowledge that are
lso important for successful innovations. In particular, knowledge
bout customer needs and also about manufacturing capabilities
nd constraints may  be especially helpful. Nevertheless, examining
nventors’ technological expertise as we have done enables us to
onceptualize and operationalize our constructs. In future research,
t would be fruitful to examine the conceptual and theoretical issues
ertinent to the consideration of other types of expertise.
Second, we tested our third hypothesis only from a cross-
ectional perspective, as we were able to obtain the organizational
ata on rank and awards as of a single point in time (as of 2007). We
cknowledge that an individual’s expertise proﬁle does not remain
tatic and would change across time; the inﬂuence of one’s exper-
ise may  also change at different stages of the inventor’s career.
ence, it may  be interesting for future research to examine whether
nd how an inventor’s expertise would affect the innovation pro-
ess across time.
Third,  as we made use of patent data to measure the breadth
nd depth of inventors’ expertise, we were able to include data
nly on inventors with at least 5 patents. This effectively narrowed
ur sample to the more productive inventors in 3M,  excluding
he less experienced inventors. However, excluding this group of
nventors is not expected to change our results, as we saw sig-
iﬁcant variance in the expertise and dependent variables for the
roup of inventors who were included in the analysis. In future
esearch, it would be fruitful to measure expertise in a more encom-
assing manner that can also include less productive inventors
perhaps via organizational patent proposal submissions instead of
atents).
Finally, as we examined a single case of one organization, the
onclusions derived are likely less generalizable to ﬁrms with dif-
erent characteristics. We  believe, however, that our ﬁndings will
pply to other large diversiﬁed ﬁrms, with signiﬁcant emphasis on
he translation of R&D work into commercial value for the ﬁrm.
ost commercial ﬁrms are facing a more competitive environment
nd increasing demands from shareholders to exhibit growth, and
ne key way to achieve that is through new product development
nd introductions. Hence, R&D departments of commercial ﬁrms
re facing increasing pressures on the output of the innovation
ipeline (Festel et al., 2010). As a result, similar to 3M,  commercial
rms are now placing signiﬁcant emphasis on ensuring that their
&D staff contribute toward the sales of products. Moreover, other
arge ﬁrms with a diversiﬁed portfolio of products will similarly be
ble to provide an environment for generalists and polymaths to
ourish, in addition to specialists.
. Conclusion
This study examines how an inventor’s expertise proﬁle inﬂu-
nces his or her success both as an inventor and an innovator,
hrough a case study of inventors in 3M.  Our ﬁndings con-
ribute to the literature on innovation by showing that breadth
f inventor expertise relates to the generation of inventions, but
epth of inventor expertise is required to generate technicallycy 43 (2014) 349– 366 365
inﬂuential patents. Finally, both breadth and depth of expertise
are required to effectively convert inventions into commer-
cially successful products that bring sales and value to the
organization.
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